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Rita Raley
It’s what we call a massive data-base tally. Gladney, J.A.K. I punch in the name, the substance, the exposure 
time and then I tap into your computer history. Your genetics, your personals, your medicals, your psychologi-
cals, your police-and-hospitals. It comes back pulsing stars. This doesn’t mean anything is going to happen 
to you as such, at least not today or tomorrow. It just means you are the sum total of your data. No man 
escapes that.
—Don DeLillo, White Noise
What is most unfortunate about this development is that the data body not only claims to have ontological 
privilege, but actually has it. What your data body says about you is more real than what you say about 
yourself. The data body is the body by which you are judged in society, and the body which dictates your 
status in the world. What we are witnessing at this point in time is the triumph of representation over 
being.
—Critical Art Ensemble
The Data Bubble
As I set about the process of wiping my machine of all cookies a few summers ago in 
preparation for the cloning of my hard drive, I was somewhat naively surprised to learn 
about so-termed Flash cookies, or LSOs (local shared objects). Internet privacy has 
always been a concern: I have long made a point of systematically deleting cookies along 
with my cache and search history, researching the plug-ins and extensions best able to 
anonymize my browsing, and using search engines that do not record IP addresses, 
particularly those that work against search leakage.1 I have also made a point of provid-
ing false personal information and developing a suite of pseudonymous identities (user 
names, avatars, anonymous email addresses), the purpose of which has been to convince 
myself that I am able to maintain some aspect of control over my own data. My error 
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was thinking within the architecture of the browser window: LSOs are, as the name 
suggests, local cookies stored outside of the browser, in my case at rraley/Library/
Preferences/Macromedia/Flash Player/#SharedObjects, and thus not deletable from 
a browser toolbar.2 In basic terms, LSOs are tracking devices within the Flash player 
that override the user’s security preferences and are set without her knowledge and 
consent. There are applications such as Flush and BetterPrivacy that will ostensibly 
manage and clean out LSOs, but their most pernicious aspect is their capacity to 
“respawn” tracking cookies with data stored in Flash; that is, Flash Local Storage is used 
to back up the HTML cookies for the explicit purpose of restoring them within seconds 
after they are deleted. These zombie cookies—and this is certainly their effect, as 
manual deletion and even the aforementioned tools are essentially futile—are made 
possible by what Adobe Systems insists is a “misuse” of Local Storage, though it is worth 
noting that the privacy settings panel on Adobe’s site is notoriously difficult to read, 
appearing as a demo rather than as an actual window.3 They have not then been invisible 
to me alone, though the larger issue of data collection continues to receive more public 
attention in the wake of investigative reports such as the Wall Street Journal’s “What They 
Know” series.4
The immediate purpose of LSOs, along with traditional and third-party cookies, is 
online behavioral advertising, the economic potential of which is no doubt clear: con-
sider the speculative value of the uniquely numbered cookie assigned to each machine, 
one that collates ostensibly nonpersonal behavioral information in order to produce a 
closely approximate demographic portrait including age, gender, location, educational 
level, income, consumption habits (purchasing and reading), sexual preference, and 
health issues.5 The “audience management experts” of Demdex, Inc., for example, 
transform the profile of a common user into one of a unique individual by combining 
the ID code from a single machine, one that holds a summary record of browsing and 
search history, with offline data including census information, real estate records, and 
car registration.6 As John Battelle puts it, this information is producing “a massive click-
stream database of desires, needs, wants, and preferences that can be discovered, sub-
poenaed, archived, tracked, and exploited for all sorts of ends.”7 Online behavioral 
advertising produces a dynamic, flexible, and perfectly customized audience, consti-
tuted by the microtargeting of the intents and interests of consumers on a massive scale. 
In practical terms, if a consumer happens upon but fails to make a purchase from a 
particular retail site that aligns with her profile, that microtargeting can become retar-
geting, which means that ads for an item she has viewed will be pushed to other non-
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retail sites, or to adopt the rhetoric of personalized retargeting companies, she will be 
found as she browses and driven back to the original site. In its ultimate form, such a 
targeting system would locate a user in close proximity to a shopping market, assess 
the whole of her shopping history, compare those purchases with those of other shop-
pers, and then push coupons based on that correlated search directly to her mobile 
device. And that vision is precisely what is driving the current data bubble, in which 
online behavioral advertising is overvalued, data brokers calculate the speculative futures 
of data (hedging bets on the unknown uses to which it will be put), and new com-
putational systems are designed to manage both these speculations and the data sets 
themselves. 
We are thus in the midst of what is exuberantly called a “Data Renaissance,” in which 
new marketing worlds await exploration and raw material—raw data—awaits extrapo-
lation, circulation, and speculation. Data has been figured as a “gold mine” and as “the 
new oil of the Internet and the new currency of the digital world,” the engine driving 
our latest speculative bubble.8 (Around the time of the worldwide financial crash, 
venture capital began pouring into online tracking.9) Data speculation means amassing 
data so as to produce patterns, as opposed to having an idea for which one needs to 
collect supporting data. Raw data is the material for informational patterns still to come, 
its value unknown or uncertain until it is converted into the currency of information. 
And a robust data exchange, with so-termed data handlers and data brokers, has 
emerged to perform precisely this work of speculation. An illustrative example is 
BlueKai, “a marketplace where buyers and sellers trade high-quality targeting data like 
stocks,” more specifically, an auction for the near-instant circulation of user intent data 
(keyword searches, price searching and product comparison, destination cities from 
travel sites, activity on loan calculators).10 If the catalog era depended on a stable indexi-
cal link between data and subject, the behavioral data banks of the present need repeat-
edly to enact that link through database operations that are not incidentally termed 
“join” and “union.” In other words, my data does not need to be stabilized as a composite 
profile subject to the interpretive work of personality analysis and motivation research; 
what matters is simply its functionality in a particular context at a particular moment. 
In 1993 Critical Art Ensemble suggested that we might begin to thwart the then-
emergent data systems by contaminating them with corrupt or counterfeit data.11 
However, data can no longer lose “privilege once it is found to be invalid or unreliable,” 
as they suggest, not only because its truth is operational—if it works it is good—but 
also because its future value cannot now be calculated. That is, it awaits the query that 
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would produce its value. Data cannot “spoil” because it is now speculatively, rather than 
statistically, calculated.12
The name for the disciplinary and control practice of monitoring, aggregating, and 
sorting data is dataveillance, named as such by Roger Clarke, who suggested nearly 
twenty-five years ago that it was then “technically and economically superior” to the 
two-way televisual media of George Orwell’s fictional universe.13 It is such because 
dataveillance operations do not require a centralized system, provided a set of different 
databases are networked and provided that they share the same means of establishing 
individual identification, so that a single unit (an individual or number) can be identified 
consistently across a range of data sets with a primary key. Dataveillance is not new to 
information technologies and certainly one could construct a genealogy of biopolitical 
management that would include paper-based techniques such as the U.S. census. Indeed, 
in an early commentary on the “electronic panopticon,” David Lyon suggests that the 
difference made by information technologies is one of degree not kind, that they simply 
“make more efficient, more widespread, and simultaneously less visible many processes 
that already occur.”14 However, one could argue that there have been qualitative as well 
as quantitative shifts in dataveillance practices in the last decade, or, more precisely, that 
an intensification of quantitative differences allows for the articulation of qualitative 
difference. Dataveillance in the present moment is not simply descriptive (monitoring) 
but also predictive (conjecture) and prescriptive (enactment). To invoke Gilles Deleuze 
on the emerging structures of continuous control and assessment, “the key thing is that 
we’re at the beginning of something new.”15
The question then becomes: what are the materially distinct features of the new 
unified and dynamic dataveillance regime? Large-scale data-aggregating corporations 
such as Acxiom and ChoicePoint and increasingly sophisticated tracking technologies 
such as Flash cookies and beacons indicate a shift in scale, while the emergence of data 
exchanges indicate a shift in the evaluation and “appreciation” of data itself.16 The linking 
of databases, corporate actors, and institutions—as is made possible by corporate acqui-
sitions of DoubleClick (Google) and ChoicePoint (the parent company of Lexis-
Nexis)—radically changes the scope of a query, as would the realization of a vision of 
data storage “measured in petabytes.”17 Speculation lurks here in the incalculable, the 
size of data storage exceeding conventional metrics and simply open to an unknowable 
future. Thus is it necessarily the case that data markets should be speculative, their units 
of exchange not even stabilized as such, and driven by techniques of “predictive opti-
mization” that attempt to generate future value.18
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Data Subjects
The syncing of browser history with personal and application data has successfully and 
for the most part uncontroversially been situated under the rubric of “enhanced user 
experience.” Apart from the brief bursts of quasi-theatrical collective outrage—we are 
shocked to hear Google CEO Eric Schmidt remark that “we don’t know enough about 
you. That is the most important aspect of Google’s expansion” or to learn of Facebook’s 
creative interpretations of privacy—there seems to have been a general acquiescence 
to the notion that the distinctions between private and public and personal and non-
personal when it comes to data are at best tenuous and that it is practically and eco-
nomically in our interest to regard them as such.19 Indeed, even as the Wall Street Journal 
starkly warns its readers to attend to the question of “What They Know,” it continues 
to speculate on the economic growth potential of data mining. The tone and tenor of 
comments in user forums ranging from Yahoo Answers to Mozilla Support and Comput-
ing.net is remarkably consistent: there are basic steps one can take to delete cookies, 
but it seems unnecessary to do so because they do not interfere with everyday computer 
use; in fact, some of them are functionally necessary and the end result is that one 
encounters advertisements that may be of interest. In order to receive customized rather 
than generalized services, one of course has to provide information to corporations and 
institutions so that they might better support our preferences, profiles, and favorites. 
After all, this line of thinking holds, do we not want a personalized Internet that adapts 
to our individual tastes, habits, and preferences? That it is even possible to speak in such 
general terms about conditioned behavior is evinced by the memes that play with 
Google’s predictive text feature: What does it think I want when I type “cow”? What 
does it think my friends want? What mark of distinction accrues to me if the first result 
is “cowboy bebop” as opposed to “cow clicker”? Such information is shared, circulated, 
and entered into the field of communicative exchange. In this respect, dataveillance 
takes its place among affect-generating mechanisms such as Facebook: voluntarily 
surrendering personal information becomes the means by which social relations are 
established and collective entities supported. Does this, however, necessarily mean that 
resignation and ironic acceptance of the new data economy are the doxa? 
Pointed questions about behavioral targeting will reveal a certain discomfort from 
a representative segment of the population; for example, 66 percent of a survey popu-
lation of adult Americans indicated that they did not want personalized advertising, 
a number that grew to 73–86 percent when participants were told exactly how 
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companies collect data for targeted ad campaigns.20 In spite of this, however, the general 
claim can still be upheld: if in response to the proposed National Data Center in the 
mid-1960s there was a significant pushback from Congress, the mass media, legal 
scholars, and the public, in the present moment Americans on the whole seem not 
to mind being mined.21 It might then at first glance seem to be possible to speak, 
as does Mark Poster, of our “interpellation” by databases. True interpellation—in his 
terms “a complicated configuration of unconsciousness, indirection, automation, and 
absentmindedness”—requires a coercive system, a “superpanopticon,” capable of ren-
dering us as both subjects of and subjects to that particular assemblage that David 
Mitchell, in a fictional context, calls a corpocracy.22 For Kevin Robins and Frank 
Webster, this is the essence of “cybernetic capitalism,” by which they mean the whole 
of the socioeconomic control system that is in part dependent on the capacity of state 
and corporate entities to collect and aggregate personal data to the extent that each 
individual can be easily monitored, managed, and hence controlled.23 As my epigraphs 
indicate, Robins and Webster are far from alone in their concern with our dynamic 
incorporation within a totalizing technological system of data management. 24 Greg 
Elmer also explicates the techniques by which consumer profiles are developed and 
individuals are “continuously integrated into a larger information economy and techno-
logical apparatus.”25 But for Elmer and Lyon and others, a crucial aspect of this incor-
poration is our voluntary participation: the composition of consumer profiles in part 
results from solicitation—whether in the form of a request for feedback or personal 
data so as to be granted access to a particular service or program—which means we 
are interpellated as “self-communicating” actors.26 To be sure, to participate in the 
project of modernity has arguably always meant that one becomes a calculable subject 
by voluntarily surrendering data. Note the established meaning of “datum” itself as it is 
recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary: “a thing given or granted; something known 
or assumed as fact, and made the basis of reasoning or calculation.” In the specific 
context of a sociotechnological milieu organized according to the operational principles 
of “cybernetic capitalism,” however, our acts of participation or self-communication 
themselves become data, the entirety of our everyday life practices subject to, and 
constituted by, perpetual calculation. What was speculative at the time of Don DeLillo’s 
White Noise (1985)—“you are the sum total of your data”—has in the intervening years 
become actualized, and neither the legal nor the political infrastructure has kept pace 
with the technology.27
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In December 2009, Google announced that search would thereafter be personalized 
according to fifty-seven signals, among them location, machine and browser informa-
tion, and prior search history.28 The company soon assured its users that it was “recog-
nizing your browser, not you,” but who or what is meant by “you” in this formulation? 
In one account, the “you” is our “data double.” Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson 
explain:
Surveillance technologies do not monitor people qua individuals, but instead operate 
through processes of disassembling and reassembling. People are broken down into a 
series of discrete informational !ows which are stabilized and captured according to 
pre-established classi"catory criteria. They are then transported to centralized locations 
to be reassembled and combined in ways that serve institutional agendas. Cumulatively, 
such information constitutes our “data double,” our virtual/informational pro"les that 
circulate in various computers and contexts of practical application.29
Financial, travel, and governmental databases might be coordinated but our “data 
doubles” are only temporarily aggregated, our user profiles produced as an effect or 
consequence of search queries rather than preexisting stable entities that are then 
subject to search. It is at this point then that the interpellation argument falters because 
the processes of subjectification at the heart of the “panoptic sort” have been trans-
formed. Along the same lines, Matthew Fuller argues that surveillance is no longer 
about visual apprehension but is instead a “socio-algorithmic process” that captures and 
calculates “flecks of identity,” the data trails of our everyday actions, such as our brows-
ing history, financial transactions, and our movements as they are recorded by GPS 
coordinates on our mobile devices and RFID tags in passports and identity cards.30 The 
“flecks” concept emerges in some respect from Gilles Deleuze’s outline of the emer-
gence of the “dividual” in the context of the control society; if the individuated self was 
both product and figure of modernity, “dividuals” are rather fragmented and dispersed 
data bodies. They are, as Tiziana Terranova explains, “what results from the decomposi-
tion of individuals into data clouds subject to automated integration and disintegra-
tion.”31 Put another way, they are the CDOs (collateralized debt obligations) of the data 
market, in which bits and pieces of a supposed composite profile, which is itself an 
operative fiction, are sliced and diced into different tranches, such that a stable refer-
ential link to a singular entity becomes lost in a sea of user intent data. The now-
orthodox market position is that the value of data does not depend on its connection 
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to an actual person, until expedience requires that a claim be made for the truth of that 
data. Our data bodies then are repeatedly enacted as a consequence of search proce-
dures. Data is in this respect performative: the composition of flecks and bits of data 
into a profile of a terror suspect, the re-grounding of abstract data in the targeting of 
an actual life, will have the effect of producing that life, that body, as a terror suspect.
Countervailing Engagements
Jack Gladney, the principal character in White Noise, is exposed to an airborne toxin and 
thereafter subjected to a battery of medical tests. The test results are then aggregated 
with all of his genetic, civic, and personal information to produce a “massive data-base 
tally,” the source and physical location of which are not identified.32 Gladney considers 
the conspiratorial implications: “I wondered what he meant when he said he’d tapped 
into my history. Where was it located exactly? Some state or federal agency, some insur-
ance company or credit firm or medical clearinghouse?” No mere paranoid fantasy, the 
idea of a single national data center as a matter of public policy was considered during 
congressional hearings in 1966, with technocratic efficiency weighed against civil liber-
ties, specifically the right to privacy, and a number of representatives expressing concern 
about the fact that “the computer neither forgives nor forgets” and is “incapable of 
making allowances for early errors or indiscretions.”33 As Paul Ohm has proven with 
careful detail, this exact vision of a data bank that “neither forgives nor forgets.” Is in 
theory realizable because of reidentification—the reversal of anonymization techniques 
with such relative ease that anonymization cannot and should not be considered a means 
of privacy protection.34 Perfect anonymity is impossible, but the nightmare scenario 
(then and now) imagines a womb-to-tomb “record prison” or “database of ruin,” a 
massive “database in the sky” held by Google or elsewhere that contains the material 
necessary to reduce the entropic uncertainty about individual identities and thus cause 
demonstrable and legally recognized harm to everyone recorded within it. Google’s 
incorporation of DoubleClick, one of the largest behavioral targeting companies, as well 
as its partnership with Verizon, would likely be the closest approximation of this single 
database fantasy, but there is as yet no one entity legally (and technologically) capable 
of aggregating the entirety of “our” data, which would include not only all governmental 
and financial records but also our entire search and purchase history, along with our 
relationship to the social graph. (The value at present is in the aggregating of just a few 
of these data components.) It is the more general sense that data storage is permanent 
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that leads Viktor Mayer-Schönberger to claim that we have been produced as Borgesian 
figures, Funes who have lost the capacity to forget and thereby lost the capacity to 
structure a temporal narrative.35 More concretely, the consequence of total storage is 
that the much-heralded second act of American lives—the mythology of reinvention—
cannot be possible if all of the data from the first act is easily accessible.
Data storage of this scale, potentially measured in petabytes, would necessarily 
require sophisticated algorithmic querying in order to detect informational patterns. 
For David Gelernter, this type of data management would require “topsight,” a top- 
down perspective achieved through software modeling and the creation of microcosmic 
“mirror worlds,” in which raw data filters in from the bottom and the whole comes into 
focus through statistical modeling and rule and pattern extraction.36 The promise of 
topsight, in Gelernter’s terms, is a progression from annales to annalistes, from data 
collection that would satisfy a “neo-Victorian curatorial” drive to data analysis that cal-
culates prediction scenarios and manages risk.37 What would be the locus of suspicion 
and paranoid fantasy (Poster calls it “database anxiety”) if not such an intricate and 
operationally efficient system, the aggregating capacity of which easily ups the ante on 
Thomas Pynchon’s paranoid realization that “everything is connected”?38
Happily, sheer impracticality means that data systems can never function as perfectly 
as our dystopian imaginations might suspect. The errors inherent within a catalog 
mailing list, one of the more basic datasets, indicates how unstable that data can be: any 
given population is a massive moving target, all the more so considering the inevitable 
introduction of false information, and the scale of the sample size—in the TIA topsight 
scenario, for example, every human entity within the U.S. borders—means that it truly 
would require the storage of petabytes of data in order to produce accurate calculations. 
Even if one were to accept the fiction of the universal database managed by a single 
authority, the fundamental problem of meaningfully, and predictably, parsing that 
archive remains. Everything might be collected and connected, but that does not neces-
sarily mean that everything can be known. Google may come to possess the sum total 
of my personal data and all of the history contained within my UID, but it cannot obtain 
the programmatic perspective necessary to predict exactly what I will buy or what I 
will read.
Still, as my Firefox add-on, Collusion, reminds me, data collection companies are 
continually tracking my browsing behavior in spite of my efforts to thwart them, a 
cogent reminder that targeting is not impractical at the level of the individual. When 
considered in these terms, it is difficult to dismiss escape, whether in the form of 
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disappearance or disconnectivity, as merely a counterfantasy.39 Critical Art Ensemble’s 
injunction is to the point: “Avoid using any technology that records data facts unless it 
is essential.”40 Howard Rheingold and Eric Kluitenberg make a comparable case for 
“selective connectivity”: techniques by which we can “choose to extract ourselves from 
the electronic control grid from time to time and place to place.”41 Similarly, for Mayer-
Schönberger, the solution lies in the adoption of a certain care in the management of 
one’s online interactions, practices of selective disclosure, and revelation in order to 
limit “uncontrollable information flows through individual choice.”42 If we are able to 
opt out of a single company’s personalized retargeting scheme, that is, should we not 
also be able to opt out of all advertising databases or indeed out of the whole system 
of “cybernetic capitalism” itself? But it is arguably the case that exit in the form of for-
getting or genuine anonymity is no longer possible, that disappearance itself has disap-
peared. Confronted with this argument we might instead imagine a systems overload, 
“an information blizzard—a whiteout,” because silence can be attained with an increased 
pitch of white noise.43 “Anonymity systems function best in a crowd” and therefore 
overflowing the system, feeding it false information, generating more “flecks of identity” 
than it can handle, might be the closest approximation of disappearance it is possible to 
achieve.44 A creative example of precisely this is Daniel Howe and Helen Nissenbaum’s 
TrackMeNot, a browser extension that works to block the capacity of third parties to 
identify users based on their search history by periodically creating bursts of search 
activity and thus hiding real searches within a batch of ghost queries. As the creators 
explain: “To level the playing field, we have sought to create a mechanism that places 
some degree of control back in the hands of users and, at every point in the design 
where this has been feasible, we have sought to do so.”45 Counterpropositions such as 
these, however, shift the burden of governance from institutions to the mythic entity of 
the individual rational actor and either argue for or presume a certain technological 
literacy from the outset.46 They also imply that data is somehow neutral and that it is 
only the uses of data that is either repressive or emancipatory.
The critical minefield one must negotiate here is structured by two tried-and-true 
narratives: one outlining systems of control and the other positioning us as well-
informed citizens who can manage (indeed “give”) our data and perhaps even turn 
dataveillance techniques to our own advantage. The version of this binary particular to 
the Internet pits monopolistic corporations seeking jurisdiction over information archi-
tecture and communication flows against those fighting to maintain open, distributed 
P2P networks (Google is the complicating exception in that it is a single entity whose 
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power derives from the management, support, and ownership of those very distributed 
networks). If considered in narrowly exclusive terms, each narrative risks a certain 
blindness: either an overinvestment in the valorization of the agency of the user who 
hacks the system or an overinvestment in the articulation of the protocols of a given 
system as inescapably binding, such that it would require naively idealistic faith if not 
false consciousness to believe in the efficacy and value of resistant and participatory 
practices. But it remains the case that constellations of control are imbricated with 
constellations of expressive resistance, whether in the form of tactical intervention, 
asymmetric infowar, or civic engagement. For every system of disciplinary power, as 
Anthony Giddens puts it, there is a “countervailing” response from those in precarious, 
subordinate, or marginal positions, which is to say that dataveillance and countervailance 
must be seen as inextricably connected.47 The practices that might be situated under 
the rubric of countervailance do not endeavor to realize an abstracted philosophy of 
resistance and human rights. They are often cognizant of such rights, particularly when 
a governmental program like Poindexter’s TIA is articulated within the field of tactical 
activity as a critical object. But their actions are more often about action itself in rela-
tion to a regime that would limit us to efforts to stay on the right side of the data that 
defines us. Moreover, the expressive aspects of countervailance as I will outline them 
here serve as an important counter to the technocratic consumer rights initiatives that 
frame the debate in terms of property—those “MyData” initiatives that seek only to 
transfer ownership of data to the individual and to develop personal data banks for 
everyday functionality and monetization.48
There are a number of practices that have the potential for disruptive innovation 
vis-à-vis the new regime of dataveillance. For example, Gary Marx outlines a range of 
behavioral techniques and legal, economic, and technological exploits ranging from 
refusal to masking that work toward “neutralizing and resisting the new surveillance” 
system; neutralization, as he puts it, is a “dynamic adversarial social dance involving 
strategic moves and counter-moves and should be studied as a conflict interaction 
process.”49 With respect to consumer (re)targeting and behavioral profiling, a common 
counter-move is the design and programming of anonymizers, encrypters, distributed 
networks, and ad and cookie blockers. Though many such enterprising programmers 
may work for large IT corporations, their software can usually be tagged as independent, 
alternative, open, and almost always free. Just as Internet data mining is dependent on 
software design, then, so, too, is the blocking or thwarting of that mining. So, to block 
beacons and zombie cookies and maintain the smallest measure of privacy while reading 
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articles in the Guardian online, one can choose from a suite of effective Firefox add-ons 
including TACO and Beef TACO (targeted advertising cookie opt-out); BetterPrivacy; 
Ghostery; CookieSafe; and CookieCuller. As Panopticlick, the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation’s browser-fingerprinting algorithm, reveals, however, privacy tools such as spoof-
ers and plugins paradoxically make the browser more distinct and thus facilitate device 
fingerprinting.50 Panopticlick further reminds us of the difficulty of demarcating an 
absolute difference between the means of tracking and the means of circumventing that 
tracking; another case in point would be browsers in which the facility for private 
browsing is built into the browser itself.
To understand the significance of software design both to mine and to obstruct, one 
has only to consider the role that computer models have played in what Andrew Leyshon 
and Nigel Thrift describe as “the capitalization of almost everything,” which is to say in 
the creation of the explosive development of financial capitalism that led up to the 
recent global financial crash. In short, “new forms of expertise, fuelled by computing 
power and software” have been necessarily constitutive.51 For example, the consolida-
tion and centralization particular to “Shared Services” would not have been possible 
without the development of a single operating system to aggregate a range of different 
activities and income streams into a single entity. “As in the case of ground rent, what 
made the mining of these new seams of financial value [subprime lending] apparently 
possible is the development of computer software that enables individuals to be assessed, 
sorted and aggregated along dimensions of risk and reward.”52 Software design did not 
simply enable the creation of new financial instruments; software design was the essen-
tial condition of possibility for these new financial instruments. So, too, the scale and 
complexity of the data structures at issue—“petabytes”—is such that they cannot be 
processed by human intelligence alone but rather require machine intelligence in the 
form of database management systems and algorithms that structure data collection.
Combating or otherwise responding to a control system dependent on computing 
power requires the design of a counter-system, a rather modest example of which is 
Diaspora, an open-source, privacy-aware, distributed do-it-yourself social network that 
eliminates the hub of a social media conglomerate in favor of a peer-to-peer network in 
which each individual is a node.53 Without a hub or central server, data encrypted with 
GNU Privacy Guard is sent directly to one’s friends rather than stored and hence mined. 
True peer-to-peer communication—that is, that which is not routed through a central 
hub—would need to move to a network such as Diaspora because the controlled appli-
cation programming interface (API) of social networks such as Facebook means that 
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hacking a hub-based network in order to convert it to peer-to-peer is difficult if not 
impossible. Regardless, we could point to numerous examples of Facebook users har-
nessing the peer-to-peer over central hub to mobilize street-based protests, in essence 
modifying a digitally centralized network so that it functions as peer-to-peer.
Another common countervailing response has been the appropriation of the tech-
nological tools of surveillance—whether that be “reciprocal transparency” (watching 
the watchers) or lateral surveillance, the myriad ways in which people keep track 
of each other with social networking platforms, cameras, and GPS-enabled mobile 
devices.54 Indeed, in the context of social media, lateral surveillance has been considered 
as a sharing practice involving mutuality and reciprocity rather than a one-way flow of 
information.55 So, too, self-directed profiling (“my preferences”) means articulating 
one’s own value as a consumer, traveler, citizen, and friend. While dataveillance func-
tions as an instrument of biopolitical control, in other words, it also enables civic 
participation, at least insofar as one regards as significant the effects of private citizens 
performing both their own background checks with Google and Facebook and their 
own market research through user ratings and sites such as Yelp. “Folksonomies,” user-
created systems for establishing value (via tagging, bookmarking, and rating) similarly 
function as a means of making community. From Amazon to Digg, there is a vast 
network to which we can turn to assess our value as producers (of comments, reviews, 
commodities) and consumers (as trusted users and buyers), one whose seemingly 
inconsequential rewards (stars, levels) mask a deep sense of community. In this respect, 
making data public is also making a commons. Apart from functioning as a rival form 
of expertise, then, one effect of these countervailing tools and techniques has been to 
re-embed dataveillance within social relations. Perhaps the best example of this is Eye-
browse, a protosocial network based on the self-reporting of one’s browsing activities 
(figure 7.1). A Firefox plugin, Eyebrowse visualizes a user’s web browsing history along 
with that of her friends, thus making visible the data available to Google and any number 
of third parties, now and in the future.56
Mimetically reproducing data collection practices increases technological literacy 
with respect to both individual everyday practice and systemic logics. Exploiting vulner-
abilities makes those vulnerabilities known. Evercookie is perfectly illustrative. The 
virtuosic work of an elite hacker, evercookie is as it sounds, a tracking device that cannot 
be destroyed. Designed as a “litmus test,” with the tag line “never forget,” evercookie 
provides incontrovertible proof of our relative inability to control the storage of cookies 
on our computers, particularly in the scripting environment of HTML 5.57 A more 
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ordinary example is the Firefox extension Firesheep, which allows users to capture the 
unencrypted login cookies of others on the shared Wi-Fi network, thereby substantiat-
ing the need for HTTPS. The hope is that participatory and educative tracking tools 
such as these produce a more-informed public and blur the lines between a data class 
that does not understand at a basic level how cookies function and a class of power users 
savvy enough to exploit the resources at their disposal in the interests of constituting 
their own data bodies. What becomes apparent after several hours of hands-on work 
tinkering in search of the perfect combination of antitracking tools, however, is that 
expert knowledge quickly becomes the aspirational goal, with legal and technological 
complaints about data mining mollified by the temporary satisfaction of having joined 
the elite data class. Nonetheless, an embodied experience of dataveillance tools and 
techniques alerts the public to its role as a stakeholder for, Alberto Melucci notes, “as 
mere consumers of information, people are excluded from the discussion on the logic 
that organizes this flow of information; they are there to only receive it and have no 
access to the power that shapes reality through the controlled ebb and flow of informa-
tion.”58 A tool such as Eyebrowse certainly gives its users access to data collection 
Figure 7.1 Eyebrowse, created by Brennan Moore, Max Van Kleek, and David Karger (MIT CSAIL).
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processes, though it might well introduce the question of the extent to which we are 
being asked to immerse ourselves in the dataveillance regime to the point of identifica-
tion in order to achieve any sort of agential position. Because inhabitation prompts 
recognition, however, a fully immersive, participatory, and identificatory practice can 
still function as a means of using a control apparatus against itself.
Mirror Worlds
Artists who appropriate dataveillance techniques and tools as a medium for creative 
production inform, enlighten, and help us to imagine otherwise by refusing the fantasy 
of exodus, a withdrawal from a given political, economic, or cultural system predicated 
on the notion that there is a neutral external vantage point from which one can begin 
the work of critical assessment.59 In a very general sense we might term such work 
immanent critique: art-activism operating within a given structure and inhabiting a 
particular perspectival frame, whether that be bioartists’ hands-on work in the labora-
tory or hacktivist interventions within networked systems. The paradigmatic instance 
of an art practice that inhabits a particular perspectival frame would be that of the Yes 
Men, whose counterfeit performances in the name of entities such as the WTO, Hal-
liburton, and Dow Chemical continue to be mistaken for the real. In work such as this, 
critique is situated in the act of mimesis, which is not a refusal of “corpocracy” but a 
reflection in a double sense: mirroring and replication, on the one hand, and critical 
contemplation on the other. A reiterative aesthetic serves to engage a public with a 
reflective understanding of the operations of power and control. Its creative, productive, 
and playful aspects open rather than foreclose lines of inquiry; in its eschewing of a 
singular and reductive negative judgment, it maintains a purchase on continuous critical 
assessment. A reiterative aesthetic can be radically transformational precisely because 
it exists in dynamic interplay with its object; it neither claims a stable outside nor fixes 
upon a synchronic slide of a system that is the inevitable byproduct of topsight.
The work of the Preemptive Media collective—whose practice includes instructional 
workshops and the re-engineering of mobile technologies—is particularly apposite for 
a discussion of dataveillance and tactical countervailance. Preemptive Media’s object is 
to exploit consumer electronics for a larger purpose, to foster not only technological 
literacy, but also critical consciousness and a kind of low-tech amateurism. In one rep-
resentative series of performances, called SWIPE (2002–2005), the collective installed 
a functioning bar in galleries and exhibition spaces and opened it up for enjoyment and 
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play.60 Patrons ordering drinks had their drivers licenses scanned and were given indi-
vidual receipts detailing the data culled both from the 2D barcode and online search. 
Computer stations in the bars displayed a web-based toolkit with a data calculator to 
allow participants to determine the market value of their individual data; they also 
displayed the decoding application used in the installations and a thorough guide to the 
process of requesting one’s data files from the large data warehouses: ChoicePoint, 
Acxiom, LocatePLUS, and Experian. The purpose was to encourage consumer aware-
ness of Automated Identification Data Capture technologies (AIDC); to give partici-
pants the experience of visualizing their own data; and to facilitate a critical conversation 
about data mining, transparency, and privacy. Swiping suggests purchasing, as if one 
uses currency to establish or prove currency, reminding us of the extent to which the 
value, significance, and indeed existence of the individual body are calculated, even 
proved, by complex systems of accounting—the precise operation of which remains 
obscure. But SWIPE interrupted the one-way flow of information from evidentiary 
subject to surveillance mechanism, enacting in the process lateral relations among the 
participants. As the bar setting indicates, SWIPE functioned within a social space, its 
relational aesthetic true to Nicolas Bourriaud’s vision of an artistic praxis that struggles 
against the reifying and commodifying of social relations by creating a space for “alterna-
tive forms of sociability.”61 Even as it introduced a certain defamiliarizing shock in 
individual participants, then, it was unambiguous about the situation of those partici-
pants within a broader political and socioeconomic matrix. As the artists noted: “Our 
hope is to encourage thinking beyond the individual self (‘I do not care if a bar database 
has my name and address and time of visit . . .’) toward understanding databases as a 
discursive, organizational practice and an essential technique of power in today’s social 
field.”62
Osman Khan’s installation Net Worth (2004) was similarly dependent on the gallery 
visitor’s swipe, in this case of a credit or ATM card, in order to mine the identificatory 
information necessary to perform a Google search to determine search rank and thus, 
“net worth”63 Drawing on the familiar practice of egosurfing, the tracing of one’s own 
virtual-physical presence and presumed importance online, this installation articulated 
a shift from the moment of the televisual record—you don’t exist unless the entire 
world sees your image—to the moment of the database record—you don’t exist unless 
you appear on Google. So, too, Net Worth invokes the discourse on reputation and 
trusted users in its equating of the assessment of net presence with the assessment of 
the value of the individual. More recently, David Kemp asked 100 people to show him 
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the identification, banking, and loyalty cards in their wallet—“anything that connects 
to a database”64—and then for his installation, Data Collection (2010), he used each data 
set to compose an individual “canvas” with photographic representations of the cards 
on which all of the personal information is visible, with some cards blacked out on 
request of participant. A small sampling of dataveillance art, these projects are both 
tactile and rhetorical, dependent on the gift of data in order to open a space for the 
critical contemplation of that data. They work with—both exploit and capitalize upon—
participants’ willingness to share data for no immediately tangible or concrete reward, 
that is, for no apparent return on their affective and participatory investment. What is 
illuminated by each is the logic of social media and relational aesthetics, which is to 
give by sharing.
A skeptical viewer might ask whether such data works are in fact supportive of, and 
thus insufficiently attentive to, their own corporate and governmental information 
architecture. But this is a variant of the old worry about artists not having sufficient 
critical distance from the capitalist, technological, scientific, and ideological systems 
within which they are working. In other words, to suggest that using data-mining tech-
niques to produce art necessarily entails adopting the very logic and optics of the dat-
aveillance society is to rehash the old problem of disinterest. The common assumption 
is that distance is necessary for critical reflection and that proximity necessarily pro-
duces corruption. But the lesson I think we need to learn from tactical media practi-
tioners more broadly is that critique and critical reflection are at their most powerful 
when they do not adopt a spectatorial position on the (putatively neutral) outside, when 
they do not merely sketch a surface, but rather penetrate the core of the system itself, 
intensifying identification so as to produce structural change.65 Such a practice—such 
a mode and positioning—goes well beyond Michel de Certeau’s notion of “undermining 
a system from within”; these are not employees wasting time and using the resources 
of the workplace to turn it against itself.66 Rather, these art-activists are creating “mirror 
worlds,” replicating the scene of data mining—swiping an identification card—to enable 
an embedded and embodied perspective of the control network through and within 
which dataveillance operates, but without the fantasy of exteriority. Instead, the force 
of the immanent critique envisioned here derives from a near-total inhabitation of the 
frame, compelling a jarring recognition from the viewer/user and leading to a temporal 
interval in which she must formulate a response, whether that be rejection or acquies-
cence. Interventionist art projects such as these work directly against the forces of 
interpellation with a counterimage of a dataveillance regime that makes that regime 
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perceptible—and if it is perceptible then it becomes possible to work concretely toward 
political transformation.
The role played by the designers of countervailing tactics, tools, and techniques is 
akin to that played by the “Keymaker” in The Matrix Reloaded: they offer access to a back 
door, a shortcut key or authenticating token that holds out the promise of allowing us 
to circumvent the programmed structure of the dataveillance regime.67 The film is 
reflexively archetypal. The Oracle instructs Neo, the One, to find the Keymaker, who 
is being held captive by a master program because of his knowledge of the rules of the 
system and his ability to open a door leading to The Source. His pre-scripted function 
is to sacrifice himself to The Resistance project. When Neo opens the door to his prison 
to find him in the act of making the single key, he announces his function: “I’m the 
Keymaker. I’ve been waiting for you.” He tells the skeptical ship commanders that he 
knows of the door and the building level “where no elevator can go, where no stair can 
reach” because he “must know” and it is “his purpose,” the “reason” he is there. And when 
he is killed by the agents after opening the door to the antechamber, he tells Neo and 
Morpheus simply that “it was meant to be.” In other words, he is programmed only to 
exploit the weakness in the system, after which he becomes expendable. Read repre-
sentationally, the Keymaker program is an integral component of the matrix: control 
systems must necessarily have moles who can reveal the means of puncturing the system 
so as to satisfy the demand for breaking through (or leveling up)—a demand that is at 
once narratological and psycho-social. These acts have precise actors (“only The One 
can open the door”), precise spatiotemporal coordinates (“only during the window can 
that door be opened”), precise organizational logics (“All must be done as one. If one 
fails, all fail”), and they can be performed exactly once. Once the door is opened or the 
threshold crossed, the act cannot be repeated. The flip side of the fantasy of total infor-
mation awareness, then, is the fantasy of breach.
But the Keymaker does not need narrative structure to legitimate his energies; 
indeed he dies even before the plot of which he speaks is realized. His role does not 
exactly duplicate that of countervailing actors—I am not after all advocating sacrifice—
but it is emblematic. On the one hand his knowledge is scripted (“I know because I 
must know”) and his circumvention of the system thus simply an exercise in self-
regulation. The extra-institutional spaces, here the hallway that is not legible within the 
matrix, are themselves built into the system and subject to management. On the other 
hand, however, the wily Keymaker does elude the agents and open the door, which is 
to say that the act is neither a protocol nor sabotage but both, and self-reflexively so. 
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So, too, evercookie, the indestructible cookie, is neither purely a tracking technology 
nor a hack designed to show vulnerabilities and SWIPE is neither actual data collection 
nor a performance of the same but both/and. In other words, dataveillance and coun-
tervailance coexist not in dialectical struggle but rather are so fundamentally entangled 
that the line separating the one from the other is unstable. Positioned as we are within 
the dataveillance regime, we cannot but employ the tactics of immanent critique, which 
depends not on an overstatement or overarticulation of totalizing control systems nor 
on a hyperbolized romance of the exploitation of these systems, but rather depends 
simply on ordinary action itself.
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Notes
1. “Search leakage” is the disclosure of search terms to visited sites; that is, a record of the path 
followed to land on a particular page. Search engines that allow one to surf anonymously, most 
of which neither record IP addresses nor use identifying cookies, include Scroogle, Ixquick, 
DuckDuckGo, and Yauba. Another way to prevent search leakage is to use network routing 
software like Tor, an “infomediary” that encrypts traffic between the individual user and the Tor 
network. More simply, encrypted search (HTTPS, or HTTP secure) does not send search terms. 
The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) maintains an extensive list of privacy tools 
for voice, email, instant messaging, and browsing, as does the Center for Democracy and Tech-
nology. See http://epic.org/privacy/tools.html and https://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/
basic/tips.php (accessed February 7, 2011).
2. A 2009 article in Wired, admittedly usually a bit delayed both with its techno-boosterism and 
techno-paranoia, suggests that LSOs have for the most part escaped general notice, a point made 
in a number of related articles then and since. See Ryan Singel, “You Deleted Your Cookies? 
Think Again,” Wired (August 10, 2009), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/08/you
-deleted-your-cookies-think-again (accessed August 10, 2009). By the time this chapter makes 
it into print, it, too, will likely seem a bit belated, particularly as HTML 5 comes into widespread 
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use, but it can be read as a snapshot account of dataveillance practices and the tactics, techniques, 
and technologies deployed to negotiate them in the era of big data, a battle that will almost 
certainly persist for the foreseeable future.
3. Adobe Statement for the Privacy Privacy Roundtables Project filed with the Federal 
Trade Commission (January 27, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/privacyroundtable/ 
544506-00085.pdf (accessed July 25, 2010). Clearspring Technologies, one of the larger 
content-sharing companies, and the developer of the AddThis platform, discloses its use of Flash 
cookies in its privacy policy for AddThis, but not on the privacy policy for the company itself. 
See http://www.addthis.com/privacy[REMOVED HYPERLINK FIELD] (accessed November 
14, 2010).
4. At the time of this writing, the “What They Know” section of WSJ.com continues to be 
regularly updated. http://online.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-know-digital-privacy.html 
(accessed February 7, 2011).
5. The concepts of “personal” and “nonpersonal” are, as one would expect, somewhat mutable 
in the context of dataveillance. The single cookie assigned to each machine is not automatically 
attached to an individual identity so, while sexual preference might in certain legal statutes be 
defined as “personal,” in the context of information security it would be considered nonpersonal. 
Personally identifiable information (PII), on the other hand, includes social security numbers, 
genetic information, biometric data, date of birth, and in some cases vehicle registration 
numbers, bank numbers, and IP addresses, although the increasingly widespread use of proxies 
makes the last more complicated. Much of the data-privacy legislation to date restricts the use 
of PII and presumes the safety of anonymization.
6. The Adobe AudienceManager platform, which is based on Demdex, invites companies to 
create a data bank based on both their own ad campaigns and data acquired from third parties. 
http://www.demdex.com (accessed February 10, 2011).
7. John Battelle, The Search: How Google and Its Rivals Rewrote the Rules of Business and Transformed 
Our Culture (New York: Penguin, 2005), 6. The structural logic behind online behavioral advertis-
ing would be the “panoptic sort,” Oscar Gandy’s descriptive formulation for the system that “oper-
ates to increase the precision with which individuals are classified according to their perceived 
value in the marketplace and their susceptibility to particular appeals.” Oscar H. Gandy, The Pan-
optic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 2.
8. Julia Angwin, “The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets,” Wall Street Journal (July 30, 2010). 
Meglena Kuneva, cited in Marc Davis, keynote presentation, Privacy, Identity, Innovation annual 
conference (Seattle, 2010), http://vimeo.com/14401407 (accessed November 12, 2010).
9. Scott Thurm, “Online Trackers Rake In Funding,” Wall Street Journal (February 25, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704657704576150191661959856.html 
(accessed November 12, 2010).
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10. See http://www.bluekai.com (accessed November 12, 2010).
11. Critical Art Ensemble, The Electronic Disturbance (New York: Autonomedia, 1993), 63.
12. Ibid., 140.
13. Roger Clarke, “Information Technology and Dataveillance,” Communications of the ACM 31, 
no. 5 (May 1988): 499; http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CACM88.html (accessed Novem-
ber 12, 2010). In this chapter I focus specifically on dataveillance in the sense of data mining 
(capture and aggregation), as opposed to the whole suite of techniques and technologies of a 
contemporary electronic surveillance regime, ranging from CCTV to biometrics, though they 
are by no means unrelated.
14. David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994), 40.
15. Gilles Deleuze, “Postscript on Control Societies,” Negotiations, 1972–1990, trans. Martin 
Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 182.
16. Beacons such as web bugs and pixels track user keyboard and mouse activity on a given 
webpage.
17. Cited in Elliott Borin, “Feds Open ‘Total’ Tech Spy System,” Wired (August 7, 2002); see 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2002/08/54342 (accessed August 25, 2010).
18. One company, [x+1], has named its product the Predictive Optimization Engine (POE ™). 
See http://www.xplusone.com/glossary (accessed November 10, 2010).
19. Quoted in Ira Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee, and Paul M. Schwartz, “Data Mining and Internet 
Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches,” University of Chicago Law Review 
75 (2008): 273.
20. We can say, then, that the privacy crisis produced by the new practices of data collection 
is to a certain extent hidden in plain sight and recognizable only in moments of elucidation. 
Joseph Turow, Jennifer King, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Amy Bleakley, and Michael Hennessy, “Ameri-
cans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities That Enable It” (September 29, 2009). 
Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478214 (accessed 
November 10, 2010).
21. Arthur Miller provides a full account of the proposal and its reception in his seminal text, 
The Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks, and Dossiers, which was itself positioned as a response 
to the idea. As he notes, the public debate managed to avoid “the fundamental policy issue of 
how to curtail the government’s increasing penchant for information collection” and a defeat 
of the proposal for the national data network simply meant that each governmental agency 
developed its own: The Assault on Privacy (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1971), 
59. In a quite general sense, public reaction needs to be situated in the particular historical, 
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sociocultural, and juridical contexts of a nation-state. Consider, by contrast, the German 
government’s successful campaign against Google’s Street View feature. For an early report on 
the issue, see Kevin O’Brien, “Google Data Admission Angers European Officials,” New York Times 
(May 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/technology/16google.html (accessed 
May 15, 2010).
22. Mark Poster, “Databases as Discourse; or, Electronic Interpellations,” Computers, Surveillance, 
and Privacy, ed. David Lyon and Elia Zureik (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 
187. The Sonmi chapters of Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas are set in the dystopian corpocratic state called 
Nea So Copros.
23. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, “Cybernetic Capitalism: Information, Technology, Every-
day Life,” The Political Economy of Information, ed. Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 44–75.
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techniques one can use to mask online activity; a detailed overview of the public outcry over 
TIA, its subsequent de-funding, and the continuation of the same data-mining exercises under 
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26. Lyon, The Electronic Eye, 52.
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considered a product of that labor and thus private property? Does the person from whom 
data originated have claims over it once it enters into circulation on the “data exchange”? 
Will data follow the model of genetic materials, with data becoming the intellectual property 
of a data broker who had altered it in some fashion? Proposed policy solutions thus far include 
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and the regulation of data centers.
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